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FOUNDATIONAL BELIEFS AND  
PERSUADING WITH HUMOR: REFLECTIONS 
INSPIRED BY REID AND KIERKEGAARD
Daniel M. Johnson and Adam C. Pelser
The most important and common solution to the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s regress 
problem is foundationalism. Reason-giving must stop somewhere, argues the 
foundationalist, and the fact that it does stop (at foundational, basic, non-
inferentially justified beliefs) does not threaten knowledge or justification. 
The foundationalist has a problem, though; while foundationalism might 
adequately answer skepticism, it does not allow for a satisfying reply to the 
skeptic. The feature that makes a belief foundationally justified is not the sort 
of thing that can be given to another as a reason. Thus, if foundationalism 
is true, we can only fall silent in the face of a challenge to our epistemically 
basic beliefs. Call this the practical or existential problem of foundational-
ism. Thomas Reid offers a rather stunning solution to this problem. Humor 
(“ridicule”), he thinks, can be used to defend basic beliefs which cannot be 
defended by argument. We develop and defend an account on which Reid 
is correct and emotions such as rueful amusement can be invoked to ratio-
nally persuade the skeptic to accept foundationally justified beliefs. Then, 
inspired by Kierkegaard, we extend the account to foundational moral and  
religious beliefs.
[W]e may observe, that opinions which contradict first 
principles are distinguished from other errors by this, 
that they are not only false, but absurd; and, to dis-
countenance absurdity, nature has given us a particular 
emotion—to wit, that of ridicule—which seems intended 
for this very purpose of putting out of countenance what 
is absurd, either in opinion or practice. This weapon, 
when properly applied, cuts with as keen an edge as 
argument. Nature has furnished us with the first to 
expose absurdity, as with the last to refute error. Both 
are well fitted for their several offices, and are equally 
friendly to truth, when properly used.
— Thomas Reid1
1Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man [henceforth EIP], ed. Baruch Brody (Cambridge, 
MA: M.I.T Press, 1969), VI.iv: 606–607. 
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The most important and common solution to the Pyrrhonian skeptic’s re-
gress problem is foundationalism. Reason-giving must stop somewhere, 
argues the foundationalist, and the fact that it does stop (at foundational, 
basic, non-inferentially justified beliefs) does not threaten knowledge 
or justification. The foundationalist has a problem, though; while foun-
dationalism might adequately answer skepticism, it does not allow for a 
satisfying reply to the skeptic. At some point, when faced with a challenge 
to an epistemically basic belief, one must simply fall silent, resigned to the 
fact that one’s non-inferential justification for one’s belief which is called 
into question by the skeptic is not communicable, not the sort of thing 
that can be given as a reason. Peter Klein takes this to be a theoretical 
problem for foundationalism; if one is to remain justified, he thinks, one 
must be able to cite one’s reason for believing as one does.2 We disagree 
that the foundationalist’s inability to defend basic beliefs with arguments 
or reasons in the face of a skeptical challenge is a theoretical problem for 
foundationalism because we don’t see any reason to think that epistemic 
justification requires the ability to justify oneself in conversation (even 
with oneself). The disparity between the two simply reflects the fact that 
pursuit of the goal of truth (epistemic justification) can come apart from 
the pursuit of social goals like agreement (rational discourse). However, 
we do think that this peculiar inability poses a very significant practical or 
existential problem for everyone, assuming that foundationalism is true. 
Sometimes we want to be able to reply to a skeptical challenge to our foun-
dational beliefs, most likely because we want to persuade the other person 
and achieve agreement with him.
Thomas Reid offers a rather stunning solution to this existential 
problem: when the skeptic challenges a foundational belief, what Reid 
calls a deliverance of common sense, we can reply by ridiculing the skeptic. 
Ridicule, Reid thinks, may succeed where argument cannot. And Reid 
isn’t alone in this surprising opinion. Søren Kierkegaard similarly thinks 
that humor can convince us of truths which argument is powerless to sup-
port. The truths Kierkegaard has in mind, though, are important ethical 
and religious truths that are not included in Reid’s first principles.
We think Reid and Kierkegaard are on to something. We will argue 
that, given a controversial thesis about the epistemic power of emotions, 
Reid and Kierkegaard are correct in believing that ridicule, humor, and 
the emotions they evoke can be employed in an attempt to persuade the 
skeptic to accept properly basic or foundational beliefs. The persuasion 
effected by this humorous defense of basic beliefs, moreover, can be a 
rational persuasion, though it does not involve giving the skeptic new 
evidence or arguments for the beliefs in question. Humor, therefore, can 
serve as a solution to the existential problem of foundationalism. It can 
2See, for example, Peter Klein, “Infinitism is the Solution to the Epistemic Regress 
Problem,” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, ed. Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (Ox-
ford: Blackwell, 2005), 131–140.
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provide us with a way to reply to a skeptical challenge to our foundational 
beliefs that involves neither searching for arguments in vain nor merely 
falling silent.3
In the first section, we will sketch the presupposition of our account, the 
thesis that emotions can be a source of justification. In the second section, 
we will show how this thesis supports Reid’s view and enables humor, 
ridicule, and related techniques to be used to defend foundational beliefs 
in the face of a skeptical challenge. In the third and final section, we will 
show how the account can be extended to make sense of Kierkegaard’s use 
of humor to defend ethical and religious truths which can’t be defended 
by argument.
A quick disclaimer: while we do think our account is for the most part 
consistent with the views of both Reid and Kierkegaard, we are far more 
interested in finding, stating, and supporting a plausible version of the 
view (that humor may reasonably be employed in defense of basic beliefs) 
than we are in stating the precise version of the view held by Reid and 
Kierkegaard themselves. For the most part, then, we will concern ourselves 
with developing the view directly rather than with historical exegesis.4
I. Presupposition: The Epistemic Power of Emotion
Our account depends on the controversial thesis that emotional experi-
ences are capable of serving as justifying reasons for belief (henceforth, 
the justificatory thesis). Put a bit differently, emotion is a (potential) 
source of epistemic justification. Though it is far from being an accepted 
view among philosophers of emotions, the justificatory thesis, or varia-
tions thereof, has been suggested and supported by a growing number 
of philosophers in recent literature.5 In this section, we’ll specify what is 
involved in this claim, briefly point out some reasons for thinking that it is 
3Reid’s “ridicule” strategy is very likely not the only solution for the existential problem 
of foundationalism. There might be other ways to persuade a skeptic of a disputed founda-
tional belief without giving the skeptic new, non-circular arguments for that belief (which 
would result in the skeptic forming an inferentially justified belief rather than a foundational 
one). Reid lists a number of strategies which may complement the ridicule strategy; see 
Reid, EIP, VI.iv: 604–613. For a development of one such strategy, involving rationally per-
suasive circular arguments, see Daniel M. Johnson, “Skepticism and Circular Arguments,” 
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (2013), 253–270, and Johnson, “The Sense of 
Deity and Begging the Question with Ontological and Cosmological Arguments,” Faith and 
Philosophy 26 (2009), 87–94.
4Showing that Kierkegaard held any view is a demanding exegetical task because of the 
literary complexity of his authorship, especially because of his use of pseudonyms, so space 
is more efficiently used if we neglect most of those exegetical concerns.
5See, e.g., Linda T. Zagzebski, Divine Motivation Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2004), chap. 2, and Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in 
Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), chap. 4; Robert C. Roberts, Emotions in the Moral 
Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), chap. 3; Sabine Döring, “Explaining 
Action by Emotion,” The Philosophical Quarterly 53 (2003), 229–230; Terrence Cuneo, “Signs 
of Value: Reid on the Evidential Role of Feelings in Moral Judgment,” British Journal for the 
History of Philosophy 14 (2006), 69–91; Ralph Wedgewood, The Nature of Normativity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), chap. 10. 
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true, and then discuss the consequences for the use of emotion in persua-
sion. We will be brief, though, because our ultimate aim is not to give a 
full defense of the epistemic power of emotions but to show how, if it is 
granted, it is possible to use humor to defend basic beliefs.6
On the justificatory thesis, emotions are, epistemically speaking, unjus-
tified justifiers (though, as we will see below, it is nevertheless appropriate 
to speak of emotions as in some sense justified or unjustified, rational or 
irrational). The justificatory thesis is not the claim that an agent can form 
a justified belief on the basis of an inference from her awareness of her 
emotional states, but rather the claim that emotions themselves can confer 
justification on beliefs formed non-inferentially out of (or on the basis 
of) emotional experience, as, for example, sense perceptions can confer 
justification on sense perceptual beliefs. For example, my emotion of com-
passion felt at the situation of a homeless child may justify me in believing 
that it is important that this child flourish (that she has worth). My emo-
tion of compassion can justify this belief even if I do not have any reason 
other than the emotion to believe this and even if I have never thought 
much about the reliability of my emotion of compassion and so have no 
independent reason to think my emotion reliable.
While it is arguably compatible with various theories of emotion, the 
justificatory thesis seems to fit most naturally with accounts of emotions 
according to which emotions are a kind of perceptual state, most often 
(perhaps always) of evaluative properties of situations. On such views, 
emotions have propositional content and are a kind of seeming state (i.e., 
the object of my fear really seems dangerous to me in my fear). The claim of 
the justificatory thesis is, therefore, that emotional experiences (seemings) 
can and sometimes do justify the beliefs to which emotions give rise and 
which, at least in the typical case, share the propositional content of the 
emotions.
Since this view of the epistemic power of emotion is a minority position 
in the history of philosophy, we’ll briefly point to a few reasons to ac-
cept it. First, there are cases which seem to support the claim that emotion 
is a basic epistemic source—the compassion example a few paragraphs 
back is one such case.7 Second, it seems we need emotion to be a source 
of epistemic justification if we are to have all the justified beliefs we take 
ourselves to have. Were emotion not such a source, much of our aesthetic, 
moral, and other evaluative knowledge would be undermined. As Linda 
Zagzebski has compellingly argued, we have a tendency to trust our 
emotions by forming beliefs on the basis of them.8 While some such emo-
tion-based beliefs are no doubt unjustified, others of our emotion-based 
6The defense of the justificatory thesis we offer here is developed more fully in Adam C. 
Pelser, “Emotion, Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Justification,” in Emotion and Value, 
ed. Sabine Roeser and Cain Todd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). 
7For some other examples, see the opening paragraphs of Cuneo, “Signs of Value,” 69.
8Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority, chap. 4.
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beliefs seem to be formed in much the same, epistemically legitimate, way 
as our sense perceptual beliefs—i.e., we have a conceptually-rich, proposi-
tionally-structured experience of the world and we affirm that experience 
in an act of judgment or belief. One way we come to believe justifiedly 
(and, indeed, to know) that sunsets are beautiful, or that generosity is 
admirable, or that friendship is valuable, or that slavery is unjust, is that 
we have particular emotions in response to situations involving sunsets, 
generosity, friendship, and slavery. Perhaps we could theoretically come 
to know these truths by testimony, but then there would have to be an 
original testifier and an account of that testifier’s original perceptions of 
these truths, and in any case surely testimony is not the primary way most 
of us in fact come to know that sunsets are beautiful. While we do not have 
space to develop these arguments in any depth here, our aim is simply to 
show that the position is at least prima facie defensible; that is enough to 
license our use of it to give an account of the use of ridicule and humor in 
defense of basic beliefs.
Another kind of support for this thesis about the epistemic power of 
emotion is the absence of good reason to reject it. The major objection to 
the thesis is the simple observation that emotions are so often unreliable; 
surely many of our obviously inaccurate emotions do not do much of any-
thing to justify beliefs. We grant this fact, but we don’t think it threatens 
the justificatory thesis. The internalist about justification can simply point 
to defeaters to account for this. For many of our emotions, we have good 
reason to think that they are unreliable or mistaken and so have a defeater 
for the justification the emotion would otherwise provide. This doesn’t 
threaten the justificatory thesis, though, since foundational justification 
is defeasible. The externalist about justification can appeal to defeaters as 
well, but may also account for the failure of many emotions to provide 
justification by noting that certain emotions are, for certain people, unreli-
able or that the emotional faculties in question are malfunctioning. This 
doesn’t threaten the justificatory thesis either, because the externalist will 
make the very same point about other basic sources of justification like 
sense perception. Sources of justification provide only defeasible justifi-
cation and, if externalists are right, they provide justification only when 
operating reliably (or functioning properly, and so on).9 The justification 
provided by emotions might be more fragile than that provided by other 
sources—that is, it might be defeated more often or emotions might be less 
reliable on the whole—but there is no reason to think that this fragility 
cancels out all the justification provided by emotions. There are at least 
some emotions, in some people, which are quite reliable and for which 
9Incidentally, the fact that the internalist and externalist can make different replies to 
this objection shows that the justificatory thesis—the claim that emotion is a source of jus-
tification—is neutral between internalist and externalist accounts of justification. (Strongly 
classical foundationalist internalist views, though, such as Laurence BonJour’s and Richard 
Fumerton’s, might rule out the thesis. More moderate kinds of internalism are able to accom-
modate it.)
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we have no defeating evidence.10 As Robert Roberts and Jay Wood have 
argued, virtually the whole range of virtues, both intellectual and moral, 
are in part dispositions to have the right emotions toward the right objects 
at the right time and to the right degree.11 Insofar as some people possess 
some virtues, therefore, the unreliability objection does not undermine the 
justificatory thesis of emotion.
A second objection to the justificatory thesis is that emotion cannot be a 
source of justification since only justified emotions are capable of justifying 
the beliefs to which they give rise.12 This objection fails to undermine the 
justificatory thesis because whatever kind of justification an emotion ad-
mits of—let’s call it emotional justification—there is no reason to suppose 
that it is either epistemic justification for the emotion’s propositional con-
tent (which is the proposition for which the emotion provides epistemic 
justification) or epistemic justification for the claim that the emotion is reli-
able. These are the only ways that the fact that emotions can be justified 
could undermine the justificatory thesis. So we need not think that the 
epistemic justification provided by the emotion reduces to the justification 
for the emotion itself.
What, then, is emotional justification? Here is one suggestion. It seems 
to have two components. First, if your beliefs about the situation which 
you then perceive emotionally are themselves (epistemically) unjustified, 
then your emotion is not justified. For example, if you irrationally believe 
that someone hit you, your angry response to the situation is not justi-
fied because your beliefs about the facts of the situation are not justified. 
Second, if your emotion is not an accurate perception of the situation as 
you justifiedly believe or perceive it to be, your emotion is not justified. For 
example, suppose you justifiedly believe someone to have hit you; your 
emotion of anger might still be unjustified in case it gets the evaluative 
properties of the situation wrong—if, for example, it was a four-year-old 
child who hit you and your anger is completely out of proportion to the 
offense.13 So, for your emotion to be justified (1) your beliefs about the 
situation which the emotion perceives must be (epistemically) justified, 
and (2) the emotion must be accurate to the view of the situation your 
10Conversely, there are plenty of sense perceptions which are not reliable and for which 
we have plenty of defeaters—good examples are perceptions of senses other than vision, 
which are often quite underdeveloped.
11Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood, “Proper Function, Emotion, and Virtues of the 
Intellect,” Faith and Philosophy 21 (2004), 3–24.
12For perhaps the best statement of this objection in the recent literature, see Michael 
Brady, “Emotions, Perceptions and Reasons,” in Morality and the Emotions, ed. Carla Bagnoli 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Pelser offers a detailed reply to Brady in “Emotion, 
Evaluative Perception, and Epistemic Justification.”
13Notice that this is not to say that the emotion must be accurate to be justified. The emo-
tion need merely be accurate to the situation as you justifiedly believe it to be; you could be 
justified and be wrong about the situation. Imagine the mother of a young soldier grieving 
over the reported death of her son, only to discover later that her son had been found alive. 
Her grief was clearly justified, even though it was inaccurate, because it was accurate to the 
situation that her evidence pointed to. 
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evidence supports.14 What this analysis suggests is that while emotional 
justification might depend on prior epistemic justification for the beliefs 
on which the emotion is based (e.g., “he hit me”), when an emotion justi-
fies a belief, that belief is a higher-order evaluation of the situation, which 
is not justified independently of the emotion (e.g., “he is morally culpable 
for hitting me and deserves to be punished for his offense”).15 So while 
the epistemic justification provided by the emotion may be dependent on 
the emotion’s being (emotionally) justified, it does not reduce to the emo-
tion’s justification.16 However this suggestion fares, it is far from obvious 
that emotional justification is the sort of thing that would threaten the 
justificatory thesis.
So far we have presented a presupposition of our attempt to make 
sense out of Reid’s use of ridicule—the claim that emotion can be a basic 
source of justification—and merely sketched some of the reasons to accept 
the claim and replies to a couple of major objections to the claim. If we 
accept this thesis, it should be obvious that emotion can be of use in at-
tempting to persuade others (though we haven’t shown that it is of use in 
defending basic beliefs, and we will not show how this is possible until the 
next section). Here we’d like to make two significant points about the use 
of emotion in argument. First, like a sense perception, you can’t simply 
use an emotion as a premise in an argument. You could use the fact that 
somebody has a particular emotion, but that (testimonial) belief doesn’t 
have the justifying power of the emotion itself. So, if you want to use emo-
tion to persuade someone through emotion, you need to get them to have 
the emotion (just as if you wanted to persuade someone through a sense 
perception, you’d need to get them to have the sense perception)—we’ll 
call this, following Alan Brinton, evoking the emotion.17 There are many 
ways to evoke an emotion; one way is to describe the situation vividly 
that you want your interlocutors to emotionally perceive in a certain light 
and hope that they have the right emotion. This is analogous to pointing in 
order to draw your interlocutors’ attention in order to get them to have a 
14Emotions are sometimes assessed as unjustified according to a third criterion, i.e., when 
you have overriding reason to believe it is inaccurate. We do not think this is a condition on 
emotional justification. Instead this is a case where you have overriding reason to believe that 
your emotion is unjustified since you have reason to believe it is inaccurate (and accuracy to 
the situation as you believe it to be is a condition on emotional justification). You therefore 
judge it to be unjustified. Merely having reason to believe that an emotion is unjustified does 
not entail that it is in fact unjustified.
15Roberts provides a very helpful and thorough discussion of the propositional contents 
characteristic of a wide range of emotion types in his Emotions.
16Strictly speaking, the justification provided by the emotion might be dependent only on 
the beliefs about the situation being epistemically justified—dependent only on condition 
(1) for emotional justification being fulfilled, not condition (2). Emotion is therefore parallel 
to testimony: if they are both basic sources of justification, they are dependent basic sources, 
since the justification they create is dependent on other beliefs being justified though not 
reducible to the justification of those other beliefs.
17Alan Brinton, “Pathos and the ‘Appeal to Emotion’: An Aristotelian Analysis,” in History 
of Philosophy Quarterly 5 (1988), 207–219.
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certain sense perception. After you’ve evoked the right emotion, you can 
then use the belief justified by the emotion as a premise in an argument—
we’ll call this, again following Brinton, invoking the emotion to establish 
a conclusion.
Second, the goal of rational discourse restricts the class of emotions to 
which a responsible arguer can appeal and the strategies the arguer can 
use to evoke them. The goal of rational discourse is not persuasion at all 
costs, but rational persuasion. You do not just want your interlocutor to 
agree with you; you want your interlocutor to justifiedly agree with you. 
This imposes limits on the emotions to which you should appeal, and 
there are norms which govern this sort of appeal. One such norm is that 
you should appeal only to emotions you justifiedly believe to be accurate 
because you should not knowingly mislead your interlocutor. There are 
more norms governing this practice, but it would be a digression to at-
tempt to identify all of the relevant norms here.18
We think that Reid and Kierkegaard both would be at least friendly to 
the notion that emotion can be a source of epistemic justification (or ra-
tional belief). Reid’s position is hard to pin down for a number of reasons. 
For one thing, it is exegetically difficult to determine precisely his view 
of the relationship between emotions and feelings, affections, passions, 
and other such terms, and it is difficult to see how his use of these terms 
line up with our use of the term “emotion.”19 For another thing, once the 
exegetical smoke clears, Reid may end up embracing a complex, limited 
version of the justificatory thesis, since he may think that only some of the 
things we call emotions are the sorts of things which can provide epistemic 
justification.20 Nevertheless, the passage on ridicule itself (the epigraph 
above) is probably the clearest passage available and it supports the claim 
that emotion (at least the emotion of ridicule) is a source of justification.21 
Kierkegaard, for his part, really never uses the language of contemporary 
epistemology and so never straightforwardly says that emotion is a basic 
epistemic source, but in light of his suspicion of reason and his apprecia-
tion of the ability of emotions, such as rueful amusement, to help us to the 
18A further investigation and rigorous statement of when emotions should and should 
not be used will yield an account of the distinction between fallacious and legitimate appeals 
to emotion in argument.
19Terence Cuneo’s discussion (“Signs of Value”) is hard to map onto our thesis precisely 
because we would need to specify the exact relations between these various terms (emotion, 
feeling, affection, passion, etc.). Nevertheless, much of what Cuneo says could be taken as 
support for the justificatory thesis.
20For a discussion of some of the complexities that are relevant here, see Sabine Roeser, 
“Reid’s Account of the Moral Emotions,” Reid Studies 4 (2001), 19–32.
21There are other passages which suggest that Reid, at least in his better moments, sees 
emotion as a basic source of justification. For instance, he talks about certain emotions being 
perceptions of beauty—Reid, EIP, VIII.iv: 779–808. Reid also allows that emotion can be a 
source of belief (see Cuneo, “Signs of Value,” 74) and that emotions can be reliable indicators 
or “signs” of the value of potential objects of thought—see Reid, Essays on the Active Powers 
of the Human Mind [henceforth EAP], ed. Baruch Brody (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1969), 
III.ii–vi: 183–185; cf. EAP II.iii: 76–80.
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truth, it would be surprising if he were to denigrate the epistemic power 
of emotion. So it is plausible to read both our authors as at least friendly to 
the presupposition of our account of their “humor” strategy for defending 
basic beliefs. In any case, though, we are more interested in giving a plau-
sible version of the view than getting the views of Reid and Kierkegaard 
exactly right, and so we’ll leave off our exegesis.
II. The (Reidian) Account: Defending Basic Beliefs with Humor
Emotion, as we have seen, can be appealed to directly in an argument. You 
can evoke an emotion, and then invoke it (i.e., its propositional content) 
in support of other claims. Emotion can persuade more indirectly, though, 
and it is this indirect way of appealing to emotion in defense of a belief 
which makes humor suited for use in defense of properly basic beliefs. 
What follows is an account of this indirect persuasive use of emotion and 
an application to basic beliefs.
The first step in the account is to notice a subset of the facts we can 
come to know on the basis of emotions: evaluations of behaviors. We can 
perceive by way of emotions whether a behavior (ours or another’s) is 
shameful, or admirable, or silly, or ridiculous, or blameworthy, or em-
barrassing, or gracious, or dangerous, or excellent, or respectable, or 
surpassingly great.22 Some of these evaluative facts about behaviors can 
give us reason to change the behavior. So, for example, if I come to know 
that my behavior is shameful on the basis of my shame, I have reason to 
stop my behavior. Likewise, if I come to know that my behavior is silly or 
ridiculous on the basis of my rueful amusement or embarrassment, I have 
reason to change the behavior.
The second step in the account is to notice that there are distinctively 
intellectual behaviors, and that two of those intellectual behaviors are believ-
ings and withholdings of belief. So my emotions can justify me in believing 
evaluative facts about my believings and withholdings. And, again, some 
of those evaluative facts give me reason to change my (in this case intel-
lectual) behavior. If I come to perceive emotionally that my believing or 
withholding is ridiculous or absurd or embarrassing, then I have reason to 
change my behavior (from believing to withholding or disbelief, or from 
withholding to belief). This reason for action is a defeasible reason, but it 
is a reason nonetheless.
The final step is to notice that all this applies to basic beliefs as well as 
to non-basic beliefs. Withholding or accepting a foundational belief can be 
evaluated in all the same ways other beliefs can, as admirable or ridicu-
lous or embarrassing. Our emotions can give us reason to change even 
our intellectual behaviors which are epistemically basic—give us reason 
to abandon beliefs which are basic, or to stop withholding epistemically 
22Some of the emotions that perceive some of these properties are amusement, shame, 
admiration, embarrassment, guilt, gratitude, fear, and awe. Not all emotionally-perceived 
properties for which we have names correspond to emotions for which we have names. 
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basic belief. In fact, withholding assent to a properly basic belief is more 
likely than withholdings of other sorts to be ridiculous or silly.
The strategy for using humor to defend an epistemically basic belief, then, 
is this. When the skeptic challenges your epistemically basic belief, find 
a way to get the skeptic to emotionally perceive the fact that he is being 
ridiculous (or shameful, or guilty, or silly, and so on) in withholding his 
assent to the proposition. For example, if the basic belief in question is the 
existence of something in the external world, get the skeptic to realize he’s 
being ridiculous in withholding his belief in the hand he sees in front of 
his face—ridiculous in refusing to believe his eyes. Then, once he’s had 
the emotion and believed on the basis of the emotion that he is being ri-
diculous, show him that this implies that he should change his behavior. 
(In many cases, it is probably unnecessary to show that the evaluation 
gives a reason for a change in behavior; your interlocutor will probably 
realize that immediately.) It is possible, then, to get the skeptic to stop 
withholding assent to a basic belief by getting him to have the right sort of 
emotional perception of his intellectual behavior of withholding.
There are four important points to note about this sort of persuasion. 
First, this persuasion is in an important sense indirect. The emotion doesn’t 
give any reason to think that the proposition which you are persuaded 
to accept is true, but only gives you reason to stop withholding your as-
sent to it. It gives you reason to think that it is true that your withholding 
assent to the proposition is ridiculous, not that the proposition itself is 
true. In other words, the emotion doesn’t give you epistemic justification 
for believing the proposition, only practical reason to believe the proposi-
tion. If the proposition is epistemically justified for you, then it receives its 
epistemic justification from some other source than the emotion which 
persuaded you to stop withholding assent to it. It follows from this that 
when the skeptic is persuaded by your ridicule to stop withholding assent 
to the challenged foundational proposition, that proposition remains basic 
for him; it isn’t epistemically justified by the emotion-based belief which 
persuaded him. For example, consider the skeptic who is persuaded by 
your ridicule to stop withholding belief in the hand in front of his face. 
His external-world belief is still basic and epistemically justified by the 
evidence of his senses. The emotion he has as the result of your ridicule 
(perhaps embarrassment, perhaps a rueful amusement) epistemically 
justifies only the judgment that he is being ridiculous in withholding his 
belief; it doesn’t imply anything about whether there is a hand in the ex-
ternal world. So his external-world belief can’t be epistemically justified 
by the emotion. The emotion only gets him to stop ignoring the evidence 
which does epistemically justify the belief (or, in more externalist terms, 
gets him to stop malfunctioning, or stop acting contrary to intellectual 
virtue, or so on).23
23Another way of putting this is to say that the emotion serves as a subjective defeater-
defeater. The skeptic has a subjective defeater for his external-world belief—his groundless 
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Second, as should be clear already, there is a range of emotions which 
could serve this function of defending basic beliefs. Any emotion which 
gives a reason to change behavior will serve. Reid cites the emotion of 
ridicule, but we think it is more natural to treat ridicule as a strategy for 
evoking an emotion, an instance of a more general family of strategies that 
fall under the broad category of “humor,” than as an emotion itself. We 
suspect that the emotion Reid had in mind is what we have been calling 
rueful amusement. When one is confronted with one’s own foolishness 
or silliness through ridicule, especially when the ridicule is legitimately 
funny and when it is applied gently and from a friend, one sees oneself 
as amusingly in error. Amusement is generally a pleasant emotion that 
involves a perception of its object as being incongruous in some comical 
way.24 Insofar as amusement is a pleasant affective state, mere amuse-
ment at oneself will not serve to motivate change in behavior. Indeed, 
recognizing that one has told a funny joke or done something legitimately 
funny, but not at all embarrassing or shameful, typically motivates more 
behavior of the same kind. If the rhetorical strategy outlined above is to 
work, therefore, the pleasant affective “feel” of amusement must be tinged 
by the negative evaluation of one’s own fault or imperfection.
In fact, we think that it is precisely in this affective tension between 
the pleasantness of amusement and the pain of self-criticism that the rhe-
torical strength of ridicule and other types of critical humor lies. When 
a person is made to laugh at herself, she is invited, as it were, into the 
third-person perspective of the other and is encouraged, even if only mo-
mentarily, to let her self-protective guard down in order to see her silliness 
as comical. Yet, depending on the severity of the error and her degree of 
sensitivity to the importance of not committing errors of that kind, her 
amusement at herself will be tinged with a bit of sadness, guilt, regret, 
shame, embarrassment, or anger at herself—she will see her error not 
merely as comic, but, to use a phrase Kierkegaard was fond of, as “tragic-
comic.” It is these negative emotions which give her a reason to change 
her behavior. In fact, one could employ the rhetorical strategy outlined 
above by evoking these negative emotions alone through harsher ap-
peals than humor (or through a kind of vitriolic ridicule).25 While it might 
sometimes be appropriate to evoke such negative emotions through harsh 
means, however, gentler and truly amusing jokes made at another’s ex-
pense, perhaps with a friendly nudge of the elbow, can soften the blow 
doubt of his senses. The emotion serves to defeat this subjective defeater, but doesn’t replace 
the senses as the source of justification for the external-world belief. Consider the following 
analogy: a statue is standing on a pedestal; someone throws a rock at the statue to knock it 
down, and I throw a second rock which deflects the first rock. The emotion in this sort of 
persuasion is like the second rock: it serves to deflect the first rock (the skeptic’s groundless 
doubt of his senses), not to replace the pedestal (the evidence of the senses) as the support 
for the statue (as the justifier of the belief).
24Cf. Roberts’s analysis of amusement in Emotions, 300–308.
25We should note that not all negative evaluations of behavior give reason to change the 
behavior.
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of the criticism and can help the person being ridiculed to feel as though 
she need not fully identify with the silly or ridiculous behavior. By seeing 
her own behavior as a bit ridiculous, she is already distancing herself 
from that behavior. The tactful ridiculer thus non-threateningly invites 
the object of ridicule to see the folly of her ways while at the same time 
feeling respected as one who is capable of recognizing that folly and who 
need not be personally defined by it. So, while the range of emotions that 
can be employed in defense of basic beliefs is broader than those evoked 
through humor, the humor family of emotions makes up a large part 
of that range and has a persuasive strength that more purely negative 
emotions lack.
Third, just as there are multiple emotions that can be evoked to per-
suade a skeptic to give up resisting a foundational belief, so too there are 
multiple “humor” strategies which can be used to evoke those emotions. 
Satire with all its varied techniques (telling jokes, “making fun,” telling 
stories, straightforward ridicule, and so on) is aimed at getting people to 
evaluate (emotionally) and change their behaviors, and so these techniques 
can be applied specifically to the intellectual behavior of skepticism about 
foundational beliefs. Reid himself uses sarcasm to good effect:
I resolve not to believe my senses. I break my nose against a post that comes 
my way; I step into a dirty kennel; and, after twenty such wise and rational 
actions, I am taken up and clapt into a mad-house. Now, I confess I would 
rather make one of the credulous fools whom Nature imposes upon, than 
of those wise and rational philosophers who resolve to with-hold assent at 
all this expence.26
One particularly interesting strategy is the telling of a story designed 
to evoke an emotional response from someone and then get him to see 
himself in the story and transfer that emotional response to himself. The 
prophet Nathan’s confrontation with David is an example of this strategy.27 
To apply this strategy to the defense of basic beliefs, think of the many 
funny stories one could tell about genuine external-world skeptics trying 
to get around in the world (Reid’s quote above contains some examples). 
Of course, the effectiveness of the indirect method of persuasion by emo-
tion will depend on the rhetorical skill of the anti-skeptic, i.e., his ability to 
evoke the right sort of emotions in the skeptic, which will involve insight 
into the emotional makeup of the skeptic and skill in the strategies for 
evoking emotions. As Reid says, “some have from nature a happier talent 
for ridicule than others.”28
26Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense, edited 
by Derek R. Brookes (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 
170. This is an example of Reid’s use of his own strategy of ridicule, but it is sandwiched 
between examples of other strategies he thinks can be employed in defense of basic beliefs—
what he calls ad hominem and reductio ad absurdum arguments (see Reid, EIP VI.iv: 608).
272 Samuel 12:1–9.
28Reid, EIP VI.iv, 606.
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Fourth, there are constraints on this sort of persuasion. This strategy 
can easily become a blameworthy sort of emotional manipulation if the 
anti-skeptic intentionally plays on emotional vulnerabilities of the skeptic. 
Recall that the goal of rational discourse is not simply persuasion but ra-
tional persuasion. This means that the anti-skeptic employing this humor 
strategy should probably seek to evoke in his interlocutor only those 
emotions which will actually result in justified beliefs (about the evalua-
tive properties of his behavior) and so give him good reason to change his 
intellectual behavior. This rules out appeals to highly unreliable and out-
of-control emotions because the skeptic will generally have good reason 
to distrust those emotions. Also, the anti-skeptic should want to evoke 
only emotions he has reason to believe are accurate; he shouldn’t want the 
skeptic to be embarrassed about his skepticism unless that skepticism is 
genuinely ridiculous. In short, this sort of persuasion legitimately works 
only on someone whose emotions are sufficiently well-formed to be used 
to correct intellectual behavior.29
We conclude that, given the thesis that emotions can be a source of 
epistemic justification, it is possible to employ ridicule and humor more 
broadly (as well as appeals to other emotions) in defense of epistemically 
basic beliefs in the face of a skeptical challenge. Humor, therefore, can 
provide a solution to the existential problem posed by the truth of foun-
dationalism.
We certainly acknowledge that we have developed this account far be-
yond Reid’s own account.30 His treatment is remarkably brief; he begins by 
stating the problem of foundationalism, that “men who really love truth, 
and are open to conviction, may differ about first principles,” and asks 
“has nature left him [the person involved in disagreement over first prin-
ciples] destitute of any rational means by which he may be enabled, either 
to correct his judgment if it be wrong, or to confirm it if it be right? I hope 
not.”31 He then gives a number of ways to resolve disagreement over first 
principles, the second of which is the “ridicule” strategy developed here.32 
He acknowledges the fact that ridicule can sometimes be inaccurate or 
absent when absurdity is present, and concludes that this doesn’t threaten 
ridicule’s place.
We really disagree with Reid only in one respect: we think that more 
intellectual behaviors than just departures from first principles (withhold-
ings of basic beliefs) are absurd and worthy of ridicule, and so ridicule 
29Some precision: the external-world skeptic persuaded to stop being a skeptic on the 
basis of an emotion he shouldn’t have trusted may still end up with a justified external-world 
belief, but he will have gotten there because of an unjustified process of reasoning about his 
intellectual behaviors.
30For a treatment of the relation of Reid’s views on humor to the surrounding philo-
sophical context, see Giovanni B. Grandi, “Reid on Ridicule and Common Sense,” Journal of 
Scottish Philosophy 6 (2008), 71–90.
31Reid, EIP VI.iv: 603–604.
32Concerning Reid’s other strategies, see footnotes 3 and 26 above.
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has a wider use than in defense of foundational beliefs. Other than that, 
though, our account is simply a development of Reid’s view. Our account 
here comes into conflict with Michael Bergmann’s reading of Reid’s view 
of ridicule.33 Bergmann thinks that, on Reid’s view, the various faculties 
produce non-inferentially justified beliefs, and that the emotion of ridicule 
(which Bergmann identifies as “the faculty of common sense”) is a distinct 
faculty which generates non-inferentially justified beliefs in the general 
reliability of the other faculties (he thinks the various first principles Reid 
lists just amount to these sorts of beliefs). Our view is somewhat different: 
the emotion of ridicule (or, rather, the emotions evoked by ridicule and 
humor) don’t justify belief in the first principles or the reliability of our 
other faculties; instead, it justifies the belief that departures from the first 
principles (that is, refusals to trust our faculties and assent to the non-infer-
entially justified beliefs they generate) are absurd or ridiculous—this is an 
evaluation of an intellectual behavior which Reid explicitly distinguishes 
from the claim that the first principle is true. Once we realize (on the basis 
of emotion) that refusals to act intellectually in accordance with certain 
principles are absurd, we may infer from this that these principles have 
a kind of privileged status and maybe even that they are probably true, 
but then we are justified in believing them on the basis of inference, not 
emotion.
Here are a couple of reasons to accept our view over Bergmann’s. First, 
it is clear from the context that Reid sees ridicule as being useful because 
of its persuasive ability—its ability to patch up disagreements over first 
principles. If Bergmann is right and ridicule only generates non-inferen-
tially justified beliefs in the reliability of our faculties, it wouldn’t be of 
much use in a dialogue because the people who need to be persuaded 
are people who are resisting the deliverances of common sense (resisting 
taking their faculties as reliable). The very faculty being resisted will not 
be of much use in breaking down that resistance; any appeal to it will be 
subject to the very problem of foundationalism Reid sets out to solve. Our 
view, however, accounts for the usefulness of ridicule in helping to break 
down resistance to any basic belief, whether the particular beliefs justi-
fied by the faculties or the general beliefs justified non-inferentially by the 
faculty of common sense.
Second, and most importantly, is it really plausible to think that the 
emotions generated by ridicule can justify someone in believing that his 
senses are reliable? Surely it justifies him in thinking only that some intel-
lectual behavior—the refusal to trust one’s senses or perhaps the refusal 
to accept the general principle that one’s senses are reliable—is absurd or 
ridiculous. In fact, Reid explicitly says that ridicule is fitted for discerning 
absurdity; he does not say or imply that it is fitted for discerning reli-
ability of faculties. The evaluative proposition belief in which this emotion 
33Michael Bergmann, “Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign,” Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research 69 (2004), 722–723.
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justifies simply does not include the content of the first principles. He may 
infer from this absurdity that he should trust his senses, and may even infer 
from this that his senses are reliable. (Though we doubt this—we think he 
only gets practical reason to trust his senses, not epistemic justification for 
thinking his senses are actually reliable. If he is epistemically justified in 
believing that claim, it must come from another source.) Bergmann may 
be right that there is a faculty which generates non-inferentially justified 
beliefs in the general reliability of our other faculties, but ridicule is not 
that faculty.34
III. The (Kierkegaardian) Extension of the Account:  
Religious and Ethical Truths
Reid isn’t the only prominent philosopher to endorse the use of humor to 
defend beliefs which can’t be supported by argument. Søren Kierkegaard 
extensively uses humor to persuade people to embrace beliefs he adamantly 
refuses to support with argument. He thinks that humor is tremendously 
important for facilitating transitions into new patterns of existence, the 
inhabitance of which includes embracing beliefs which cannot be sup-
ported by arguments. The foundational beliefs Kierkegaard uses humor to 
support, though, are somewhat different than Reid’s. Kierkegaard is most 
interested in important ethical and religious beliefs. Kierkegaard therefore 
represents an extension of Reid’s use of humor into the realm of ethical and 
religious truths.35 In this section, we’ll show how the account developed in 
the last section can be extended in the way Kierkegaard wants.
All that is needed to license this extension is the claim that certain 
ethical and religious truths are foundational in much the way that ex-
ternal-world beliefs are foundational. The most sophisticated and popular 
contemporary expression of this sort of claim is Reformed epistemology, 
inspired originally by John Calvin.36 Calvin thinks that foundational reli-
gious beliefs come from two sources: the sense of deity, which all people 
have and which grants general knowledge of God as creator and the law 
34Reid calls both the particular deliverances of the faculties (like my belief that there is a 
cup in front of me) and the general beliefs in the reliability of those faculties (like my belief 
that I should trust my senses) first principles. It is difficult to understand Reid here; what is 
he up to? One way is to go with Bergmann and claim that there is another faculty which gen-
erates non-inferentially justified beliefs in the general reliability of one’s faculties, but if this 
is so, ridicule is not that faculty, and ridicule can be employed to defend both the particular 
deliverances and the general beliefs. Another way would be to claim that Reid shouldn’t 
have identified the general truths about reliability as beliefs which are justified foundation-
ally, but instead as (non-basic) descriptions of the operations of the various basic sources of 
justified beliefs—any departures from which are ridiculous. However Reid is interpreted or 
his position modified, though, ridicule is not the faculty of common sense, and that is what 
is important for our purposes.
35Reid also thinks some ethical truths are basic and so thinks that the ridicule strategy 
can be employed to defend them; see Reid’s discussion of the “first principles of morals” in 
EAP V.i: 360–370. Kierkegaard goes beyond him, though, as to the religious content of those 
ethical beliefs and as to the basicality of specifically religious beliefs.
36For a prominent contemporary example, see Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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of God, and the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, which is had only by 
believers and which grants knowledge of specifically Christian doctrines. 
There is reason to believe that Kierkegaard held a very similar view. He 
certainly endorses both generically theistic and specifically Christian be-
liefs, but is vociferous in his attacks on any apologetic attempt to defend 
them with argument.37 He writes,
So rather let us mock God, out and out, as has been done before in the 
world—this is always preferable to the disparaging air of importance with 
which one would prove God’s existence. For to prove the existence of one 
who is present is the most shameless affront, since it is an attempt to make 
him ridiculous. . . . How could it occur to anybody to prove that he exists, 
unless one had permitted oneself to ignore him, and now makes the thing all 
the worse by proving his existence before his nose?38
Kierkegaard here is treating the presence of God to us as analogous 
to the physical presence of others—we are acquainted with his presence 
in a way not able to be communicated in an argument. And Kierkegaard 
agrees with Reid in thinking that arguing directly for this sort of founda-
tional belief is foolish and can only obscure the truth of the belief.39
If certain ethical and religious beliefs are foundational in the way that 
external-world beliefs are—if God is present to all, as Kierkegaard and the 
Reformed tradition have claimed—then refusal to acknowledge God’s 
presence (and the eternal ethical demands it places on us) is subject to 
many of the same evaluations as the external world skeptic’s refusal to 
believe his senses.40 In both cases, the skeptic’s withholding may be ridicu-
lous, embarrassing, silly, foolish, sad, and even blameworthy. The same 
fact that (according to Kierkegaard) makes arguing for God ridiculous and 
shameful even more obviously makes refusing to acknowledge God ridic-
ulous and shameful. Since the intellectual behavior of withholding belief 
in each case is subject to similar evaluations, many of the same emotional 
responses are appropriate and able to show the skeptic the “tragic-comic” 
error of his ways. It follows that a quite similar strategy to Reid’s can be 
followed to persuade the ethical and religious skeptic to stop withholding 
his assent to those religious and ethical truths: we can try to evoke in the 
37See, for example, Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. Howard and Edna Hong 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 192–193.
38Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. Walter Lowrie and David F. Swenson (Princ-
eton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941), 485. Here we quote the older Lowrie/Swenson 
translation because the key word (“present”) is mistranslated in the Hongs’ edition. The page 
number for the Hongs’ edition is 545.
39Reid explains: “When we attempt to prove by direct argument, what is really self-
evident [i.e., foundational], the reasoning will always be inconclusive; for it will either take 
for granted the thing to be proved, or something not more evident; and so, instead of giving 
strength to the conclusion, will rather tempt those to doubt of it, who never did so before” 
(EAP V.i: 361).
40Recall that non-basic beliefs and withholdings of non-basic beliefs can be ridiculous as 
well.
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skeptic the right sort of emotional perception of his skepticism, on the 
basis of which we can persuade him to abandon that skepticism.
Therefore, if the relevant religious and ethical truths are indeed foun-
dational, then an extension of Reid’s persuasive strategy in defense of 
those truths is possible. There are four points to make about this sort of 
persuasive strategy, each of them an application of the four points made 
in the last section. First, the sort of persuasion effected by this strategy is 
still indirect. Belief in God or in certain ethical truths is not justified by the 
appeal to emotion which gets the skeptic to stop withholding belief; what 
epistemic justification those beliefs have comes from their normal source 
(if the Reformed tradition is to be believed, the sense of deity). The humor 
does not support the claim that God exists; instead, it convinces the skeptic 
to repent of the intellectual behavior of refusing to acknowledge that God 
exists. This fits nicely with Kierkegaard’s critique of traditional Christian 
apologetics. He says,
People try to persuade us that the objections against Christianity spring 
from doubt. That is a complete misunderstanding. The objections against 
Christianity spring from insubordination, the dislike of obedience, rebellion 
against all authority. As a result people have hitherto been beating the air 
in their struggle against objections, because they have fought intellectually 
with doubt instead of fighting morally with rebellion.41
The humor strategy doesn’t fight intellectually with doubt because it 
doesn’t give any more justification for thinking that God exists. Instead, it 
fights morally with rebellion because it shows the skeptic the moral and 
evaluative qualities of his skepticism, qualities which give him reason to 
repent of that skepticism. This humor strategy, then, might be thought 
of as forming a large part of Kierkegaard’s own persuasive method, his 
answer to traditional Christian apologetics.
Second, as we noted in connection with the application of this per-
suasive strategy to external world skepticism, a variety of emotions can 
be evoked to motivate abandonment of skepticism toward foundational 
moral and religious truths. The range of emotions involved here may be 
somewhat different from those discussed in the last section, however, 
due to the greater moral import of rejecting fundamental ethical and re-
ligious truths. Whereas the effectively persuaded external world skeptic 
is likely to perceive the ridiculous nature of his skepticism with emotions 
such as rueful amusement and embarrassment (and thereby justifiedly 
believe his skepticism is ridiculous), the effectively persuaded moral 
or religious skeptic may also perceive his foolish rejection of important 
moral and religious truths with more morally-charged emotions such as 
guilt, shame, and contrition (which likewise provide justification for the 
belief that his intellectual/moral behavior is foolish, wrong, blameworthy, 
41Soren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Kierkegaard, trans. Alexander Dru (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1938), entry 629. Quoted in the editors’ introduction to Works of Love, 11.
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etc.).42 Yet, as explained above, the partially pleasant affective feel of 
amusement at oneself, due to the psychological distancing from one’s 
faults that such amusement involves, makes rueful amusement perhaps 
more effective, at least initially, in helping the skeptic to see the folly of her 
ways than more purely negative emotions, which the skeptic may be more 
likely to resist, ignore, or suppress.
Third, there is a similar variety of strategies for the employment of this 
persuasion. Kierkegaard famously uses stories or sketches in which he 
sketches personalities that exemplify various worldviews and lifestyles 
in order to evoke amusement and pity for the characters and to guide 
the sufficiently self-reflective reader to see himself in those characters and 
thus to recognize the need for a change in behavior. Much of Either/Or, 
especially the first volume, which includes a number of sketches of kinds 
of people who do not acknowledge eternal ethical demands on their lives, 
is designed to accomplish precisely this.43
Fourth and finally, the application of this method of rational emotional 
persuasion to moral and religious truths can be abused by evoking emo-
tions that are unreliable for one’s interlocutor. We should want the skeptic 
to have and to act only on accurate emotions, which means we should want 
them to be ruefully amused only when they are in fact acting ridiculously. 
What is more, we should want them to be ruefully amused (or embar-
rassed, or ashamed, and so on) about the right thing. When persuading 
an individual to stop rejecting basic moral and religious truths, we do not 
want them to be ashamed or embarrassed that someone more intelligent 
than them thinks them ridiculous for their beliefs (or withholdings) or 
because they are the only person in the room who doesn’t accept these 
truths. Neither of these states of affairs is actually ridiculous. Rather we 
want them to be ashamed or embarrassed on account of their (accurate) 
perception of their folly. This is one of the reasons for Kierkegaard’s fre-
quent employment of pseudonyms—he did not want his own personality 
or his readers’ concern to meet social expectations to distract from or be 
obstacles to his readers’ (emotional) perception of their own relationship 
with God.
So far in this section, we’ve shown how the Reidian strategy of de-
fending basic beliefs with humor can be extended to basic ethical and 
religious beliefs. We’ve only given hints as to why we identify Kierkeg-
aard as our inspiration for this extension. Our major reason for thinking 
that Kierkegaard advocates this use of humor to defend epistemically 
basic ethical and religious beliefs is his theory of the stages of existence. 
42In accepting the general outlines of Kierkegaard’s strategy of indirect persuasion by 
humor, we are not committed to every detail of Kierkegaard’s distinctive analysis of humor. 
See C. Stephen Evans, “Kierkegaard’s View of Humor: Must Christians Always Be Solemn?” 
Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987), 176–186; reprinted in C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard on Faith and 
the Self (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006), 81–92.
43Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or I and II, ed. trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987).
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Famously, Kierkegaard thinks that human beings live according to iden-
tifiable patterns, patterns he calls “stages” or “spheres” of existence—the 
aesthetic sphere, the ethical sphere, and the religious sphere (further di-
vided into non-Christian and Christian religiousness). There are patterns 
of life (spheres) which serve as transitions between the more significant 
spheres; these transitional spheres Kierkegaard identifies as irony and 
humor. So Kierkegaard thinks that a pattern of life which involves rec-
ognition of irony and humor (i.e., the emotional/moral/spiritual maturity 
to laugh at oneself) is important for the transitions into the ethical and 
religious spheres of life—and central to these spheres is the acceptance 
of certain truths which cannot be supported by argument (eternal ethical 
demands, the existence of God, and the truths of the Christian faith, to 
name a few). Now, the use of humor which we’ve sketched certainly isn’t 
all Kierkegaard has in mind when he identifies irony and humor as transi-
tion stages,44 but we think that it is at least part of what he has in mind, 
especially considering his own use of humor to persuade his readers of 
ethical and religious truths and his severe strictures on the use of argu-
ments to persuade of such truths.
In any case, we have sketched an account which makes sense of the use 
of humor, ridicule, and the emotions they evoke to defend foundational 
beliefs in the face of a skeptical challenge. If emotions can directly provide 
epistemic justification, then they can indirectly be used to solve the exis-
tential problem of foundationalism, whether it crops up with respect to 
foundational beliefs in an external world or with respect to foundational 
ethical and religious beliefs.45
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